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This is the introduction and summary to the fifth phase of an ongoing project on Social Security Programs
and Retirement Around the World. The first phase described the retirement incentives inherent in plan
provisions and documented the strong relationship across countries between social security incentives
to retire and the proportion of older persons out of the labor force.  The second phase documented
the large effects that changing plan provisions would have on the labor force participation of older
workers.  The third phase demonstrated the consequent fiscal implications that extending labor force
participation would have on net program costs—reducing government social security benefit payments
and increasing government tax revenues.  The fourth phase presented analyses of the relationship between
the labor force participation of older persons and the labor force participation of younger persons in
twelve countries.  We found no evidence that increasing the employment of older persons will reduce
the employment opportunities of youth and no evidence that increasing the employment of older persons
will increase the unemployment of youth.
This phase is intended to set the stage for and inform future more formal analysis of disability insurance
programs, with this key question:  Given health status, to what extent are the differences in LFP across
countries determined by the provisions of disability insurance programs?  Here we first consider changes
in mortality over time and in particular the relationship between mortality and labor force participation,
thinking of mortality as one indicator of health that is comparable across countries and over time in
the same country.  We then consider how mortality is related to other indicators of health status, in
particular self-assessed health and then how trends in DI participation are related to changes in health.
Finally we consider the effect on disability insurance participation of “natural experiments” in which
the disability insurance reforms were not prompted by changes in health status or by changes in the
employment circumstances of older workers.  We find that these “exogenous” reforms can have a
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Through the coordination of work by a team of analysts in twelve 
countries, the international social security project has used the vast differences in 
social security programs across the countries as a natural laboratory to study the 
effects of program provisions on the labor force participation of older persons. 
The program results have shown that in most countries the provisions of social 
security programs per se, along with related programs, provide strong incentive 
to leave the labor force at young ages and that reducing the inducement to leave 
the labor force can yield very large improvements in the financial position of 
government budgets. The work to date has also made clear that disability 
insurance programs play an especially large role in the departure of older 
persons from the labor force, as many pass through disability insurance on their 
path from employment to retirement. Thus with this volume we have begun a 
series of analyses to focus particular attention on the effect of disability programs 
on retirement and the potentially large effects that changes in these programs 
could have on the labor force participation of older workers.   
This issue is particularly pressing given demographic trends that will 
increase the cost of social security and health care programs and are likely to 
increase the need for people in many countries to prolong their working lives.  In 
almost every industrialized country the population is aging rapidly and individuals 
are living longer. These demographic trends have placed enormous pressure on 
the financial viability of the pay-as-you-go social security systems in these 
countries. The financial pressure has been compounded, until recently, by 
retirement at younger and younger ages, one of the most dramatic features of 
labor force change over the past several decades. Because of population aging 
and longer life expectancies, a larger fraction of the population is receiving social 
security benefits, compared to the fraction of persons in the labor force and 
paying for the benefits. It seems likely that the social security systems in many 
countries will have to be reformed to be financially viable.    4 of 47 
 
  We have found in our work to date that in many countries disability 
programs essentially provide early retirement benefits before the social security 
eligibility age. Figure 1 shows the proportion of men collecting disability benefits 
at age 45 and at age 64 for eight countries. Within each of the two groups of 
countries, the proportion collecting disability benefits is about the same at age 
45—2 or 3 percent in the first group and 4 or 5 percent in the second group. Yet 
in both groups, by age 64 there are large differences in the proportion collecting 
DI benefits (or other programs such as sickness insurance programs which in 
some countries are a gateway to DI). It is implausible that the rate of physical 
disability varies so much among these industrialized countries.
1  
This volume presents analysis of historical trends in our group of countries 
that is intended to set the stage for further more formal analysis of disability 
insurance programs.   
 
This is the fifth phase of the ongoing project and the first in a series of 
volumes on disability insurance. The first phase of the project described the 
retirement incentives inherent in plan provisions and documented the strong 
relationship across countries between social security incentives to retire and the 
proportion of older persons out of the labor force (Gruber and Wise 1999).  The 
second phase, based on microeconomic analysis of the relationship between a 
person’s decision to retire and the program incentives faced by that person, 
                                                 
1 The data for France are for ages 50 and 59. The proportion in France rises from 5 
percent at age 50 to 18 percent by age 59.  The proportion falls to 3 percent by age 61 
and to 1 percent by age 66 as retirees take up normal retirement benefits.   5 of 47 
documented the large effects that changing plan provisions would have on the 
labor force participation of older workers (Gruber and Wise 2004).  The third 
phase (Gruber and Wise 2007) demonstrated the consequent fiscal implications 
that extending labor force participation would have on net program costs—
reducing government social security benefit payments and increasing 
government tax revenues.  The analyses in the first two phases, as well as the 
analysis in the third phase, are summarized in the introduction to the third phase. 
 
In the fourth phase (Gruber and Wise 2010) we directed attention to the 
oft-claimed proposition that incentives to induce older persons to retire—inherent 
in the provisions of social security systems—were prompted by youth 
unemployment.  Many have worried that if the incentives to retire were removed, 
and older persons stayed longer in the labor force, the job opportunities of youth 
would be reduced.  We found no evidence to support this “boxed economy” 
proposition.  In short, we concluded: “the overwhelming weight of the evidence, 
as well as the evidence from each of the several different methods of estimation, 
is contrary to the boxed economy proposition.  We find no evidence that 
increasing the employment of older persons will reduce the employment 
opportunities of youth and no evidence that increasing the employment of older 
persons will increase the unemployment of youth.” 
 
  The results of the ongoing project are the product of analyses conducted 
for each country by analysts in that country.  Researchers who have participated 
in the project are listed below.  The authors of the country papers in this volume 
are listed first; others who have participated in one or more of the first four 
phases are listed second and shown in italics:  
 
 Belgium   Alain  Jousten,  Mathieu Lefèbvre, Sergio Perelman, 
    Pierre Pestieau, Raphaël Desmet, Arnaud Dellis, and 
    Jean-Philippe Stijns 
  Canada    Michael Baker, Kevin Milligan, and Jonathan Gruber 
 Denmark   Paul  Bingley,  Nabanita Datta Gupta, and Peder J. 
    Pedersen 
  France    Luc Behaghel, Didier Blanchet, Thierry Debrand, 
    Muriel  Roger,  Melika Ben Salem, Antoine Bozio, 
    Ronan  Mahieu,  Louis-Paul  Pelé,  and Emmanuelle 
    W a l r a e t   
  Germany    Axel Börsch-Supan, Hendrik Juerges, Reinhold 
    Schnabel,  Simone  Kohnz,  and Giovanni Mastrobuoni 
  Italy      Agar Brugiavini and Franco Peracchi     
 Japan    Takashi  Oshio,  Satoshi  Shimizutani,  Akiko Sato 
    O i s h i ,   and Naohiro Yashiro 
 Netherlands   Adriaan  Kalwij,  Arie Kapteyn, and Klaas de Vos  
 Spain    Pilar  Garcia  Gomez, Sergi Jiménez-Martín, Judit 
    Vall-Costelló,  Michele Boldrín, and Franco Peracchi     6 of 47 
  Sweden    Lisa Jönsson, Mårten Palme and Ingemar Svensson 
  United Kingdom  James Banks, Richard Blundell, Antonio Bozio, Carl 
    Emmerson,  Paul Johnson, Costas Meghir, and  
    S arah Smith   
 United  States Kevin  Milligan,  Jonathan Gruber, Courtney Coile, 
    and Peter Diamond 
  
  An important goal of the project has been to present results that were as 
comparable as possible across countries.  Thus the papers for each phase were 
prepared according to a detailed template that we prepared in consultation with 
country participants.  In this introduction, we summarize the collective results of 
the country analyses and borrow freely from the country papers.  In large part, 
however, the results presented in the introduction could only be conveyed by 
combined analysis of the data from each of the countries.  The country papers 
themselves present much more detail for each country and, in addition to 
template analyses performed by each country, often present country-specific 
analysis relevant to a particular country.  These country-specific analyses are 
especially important in this phase because the available data varied considerably 
from country to country.  In addition, the country papers typically present results 
separately for both men and women.  In this introduction, however, we usually 
present results for men only, except in cases where it is important to emphasize 
different effects of reforms, for example, by gender.   
 
The historical analysis in this volume is intended to set the stage for more 
formal analysis of disability insurance programs.  The key question that future 
analysis will address is this:  Given health status, to what extent are the 
differences in labor force participation (LFP) across countries determined by the 
provisions of disability insurance programs?  This question raises several issues:  
(1) we need to develop measures of health that are comparable across countries, 
(2) we need to understand to what extent disability insurance reforms are 
prompted by health status in a country, and (3) we need to understand whether 
disability insurance provisions are prompted by the employment circumstances of 
older people in each country.  To this end: 
 
  We first consider trends in health status over the past four or five decades.  
One of the important challenges we face in cross-county comparison of disability 
insurance (DI) programs is that commonly used health measures are not 
comparable across countries.  For example self-assessed health (SAH) status is 
known to be determined in important part by country-specific response effects.  
One important measure of health status that is comparable across countries and 
across time within countries, however, is mortality.  Thus we begin in section 1 by 
considering changes in mortality over time and in particular the relationship 
between mortality and labor force participation.  In section 2 we consider how 
mortality is related to self-assessed health, perhaps the most widely used single 
measure of health status within countries.  In particular we consider how the   7 of 47 
change in mortality is related to change in SAH. In section 3 we consider how 
mortality is related to other indicators of health status.   
  
  With a view to issue (2), in section 4 we consider how DI reforms are 
related to changes in health, in particular measured by change in mortality.  Then 
in section 5, with a view to both issues (2) and (3), we consider DI reforms as 
natural experiments—that are not prompted by changes in the health of older 
persons or changes in the employment circumstances of older persons—and we 
show that these “exogenous” reforms can have a very large effect on the labor 
force participation of older workers.
2 
 
1.  Mortality and Labor Force Participation 
 
We begin with an examination of mortality and how it relates to labor force 
participation. We take mortality here as an indicator of health and the analysis 
aims to uncover information on how labor force participation at older ages is 
affected by changes in health. Mortality is chosen as a starting point because 
mortality data is readily available and well-measured in each country. Moreover, 
without reservation, mortality can be compared both across countries and within-
countries over time. We realize of course that mortality is not the same as 
morbidity or other measures of health status that may be based on summaries of 
a large number of health indicators.  In section 2 we consider how mortality is 
related to SAH, perhaps the most commonly used measure of health.  The 
development of health measures that are comparable across countries will be a 
major part of our further more formal analysis of disability insurance programs.  
 
In this section we explore mortality trends in our 12 industrialized countries, with 
emphasis on mortality and labor force participation.  We begin by documenting 
long-run trends in mortality, using several graphical approaches. We then 
compare the mortality trends to labor force participation.   
 
Decline in Mortality: We begin with a standard way to show mortality 
decline.  Figure 1-1a and 1-1b show the decline in mortality at age 65 over the 
past six decades in each of the countries.  Two features of the data stand out.  
First, in most of the countries the decline did not begin until about 1970.  Indeed 
in several countries—Italy, Denmark, Germany, and the Netherlands—mortality 
increased between 1950 and 1970,  Second, thereafter, the decline is generally 
greater for countries that had the highest mortality rates in 1970.  Thus there 
seems to be some convergence of mortality rates in these countries since 1970.  
The country papers show these data for ages 55, 60, and 65.  
                                                 
2 The results reported here are all based on within-country historical analysis.  As the 
project progresses, more of the analysis will rely on the nexus of more recent and 
comparable longitudinal studies--Health and Retirement Study (HRS) in the U.S., the 
English Longitudinal Study of Aging (ELSA), the Survey of Health, Aging and Retirement 





Equivalent Mortality Ages:  There are several ways to present mortality 
data that highlight more clearly the implications of mortality declines for health.   9 of 47 
One way is to ask how old you had to be today to have the same mortality as a 
person of a given age in an earlier year.  For example consider the mortality rate 
of persons age 65 in the 1960s.  Then consider the age at which the same 
mortality rate occurred in later years.   Figure 1-2a shows the ages of equivalent 
mortality in the United Kingdom.  Men at age 74 in 2007 had about the same 
mortality rate as men age 65 in the 1960s.  The difference is about 9.8 years.  
That is, by this measure, men age 74 felt about as old as men age 65 four or five 
decades earlier.  Figure 1-2b and 1-2c show the same comparison for the United 
States and France; the differences are 9.2 and 9.6 years respectively.  Thus by 
this measure there has been a very large improvement in health (a reduction in 
the mortality rate) over the past several decades.  Below we compare equivalent 
mortality ages to equivalent self-assessed health ages, which may be closer to 
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Table 1-1 shows 
the age in 2005 with the 
same mortality as age 65 
year old men in the early 
1960s for each of the 
countries.  Although in 
each country the 
equivalent mortality age 
in 2005 was substantially 
greater than age 65 
mortality in the early 
1960s, there is also 
substantial variation in 
the 2005 equivalent age--
from a low of age 69.7 
and an increase of 4.7 
years in the Netherlands 
to a high of age 75 and 
an increase of 10 years in 
Japan.  Figure 1-3 shows 
the gain in equivalent 
mortality years (the equivalent mortality age in 2005 minus 65) was strongly 
related to initial mortality in at age 65 in the early 1960s.  The increase was 
greater for countries with the highest mortality in the 1960s.  Like Figures 1-1a 















Belgium 1960 3.53% 72.8 7.8
Canada 1961 3.26% 73.4 8.4
Denmark 1961 2.69% 70.0 5.0
France 1960 3.22% 73.5 8.5
Germany 1960 4.15% 73.2 8.2
Italy 1960 3.06% 72.8 7.8
Japan 1960 3.56% 75.0 10.0
Netherlands 1960 2.35% 69.7 4.7
Spain 1960 3.54% 71.9 6.9
Sweden 1960 2.37% 71.4 6.4
UK 1960 3.53% 73.4 8.4
US 1960 3.84% 74.1 9.1
Table 1-1.  Gain in equivalent mortality age, early 
1960s to 2005, for men age 65 in initial year  12 of 47 
Figure 1-3. Gain in equivalent mortality age 1960 to 
2005 vs age 65 mortality rate in 1960 for men
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  Employment by Age:  We next present a series of figures to describe the 
change over time in the relationship between employment and mortality and the 
relationship between employment and age.  We begin with employment by age 
now and then turn to employment by mortality and how it has changed over time.    
Figure 1-4a and 1-4b show employment by age.  The key conclusion is that while 
the employment rate was similar for most of the countries through age 50, 
because of differences in retirement programs, the employment rates varies a 
great deal by age 65.   Figure1-4a shows employment by age in the 11 
countries.
3  In 9 of the 11 countries employment in the 45 to 49 age interval was 
between was between 85 and 89 percent, but by age interval 60 to 64 the 
employment rate varied from 18 to 56 percent, and (for 7 of the 11) was between 
2.6 to 31 percent in the 65 to 69 age interval.  Figure 1-4b shows employment by 
year for 7 of the 12 countries.  In these 7 countries the employment rate was 
between 83 and 90 percent at age 50 but by age 64 the employment rate varied 
from about 10 to 59 percent.  
   
                                                 
3 Italy is excluded because data for Italy are available only for men and women 




  Mortality by Age: We now turn to employment by mortality and begin by 
describing mortality by age across the countries.  Figure 1-5a shows mortality for 
selected ages in 2005 in the twelve countries.  While there are differences across   14 of 47 
countries, the variation appears small relative to differences in employment by 
age.  Figure 1-5b shows mortality by age for each country.  The differences 
across countries are essentially bounded by the lowest mortality rate in Japan 
and the highest rate in the United States.  The country trends are ordered by 
mortality at age 70, from high to low as indicated in the legend.   
   15 of 47 





































































  Employment by Mortality:  We want understand how employment varies 
across countries, given health.  Again, we use mortality as our measure of 
health, sticking with a measure that is comparable across countries.  We then 
compare the employment rate across countries for given levels of mortality.    
Figure 1-6a shows employment by mortality for seven countries by single-year 
age intervals.  At the ages at which the mortality rates in these countries were 
about 0.5 percent in each of the countries, the employment rates are very similar 
in the countries, ranging from about 0.82 to 0.90.  But as the mortality rate 
increases, the divergence across the countries increases.  For example, at the 
age at which the mortality rate in each of the countries was 1.5 percent, the 
employment rates varied from about 7 percent in France to about 50 percent in 
the United State.  Like the increasing divergence in employment rates by age, 
the divergence as persons age and mortality increases reflects the large variation 
in the provisions of retirement pathways. 
 
  Figure 1-6b shows mortality rates for 10 countries (excluding Sweden and 
Italy which are included in Figure 1-6a) by five-year age intervals.  The general 
features of the figure are the same as those of Figure 1-6a.  The cross-country 
employment rates diverge as mortality increases.  This pattern is especially 
apparent for the seven countries with similar employment rates—ranging from 
0.85 to 0.89—when the mortality rate is around 0.2 percent.  When the mortality 
rate was about 1.1 percent in each country, the employment rate ranged from 
0.17 to 0.58.   












































To understand the cross-country comparisons in Figures 1-6a and 1-6b, it 
helps to consider in more detail the relationship between employment and 
mortality.  Figure 1-7a shows the relationship between age and employment in   17 of 47 
1977 and 2007.  As highlighted, the employment rate at ages 62 and 63 changed 
little over this 30-year period.  But at these ages the mortality rates declined 
substantially between 1977 and 2007—about 1 percent at each age.  Figure 1-
7b, presents a different view of the data, showing the employment rate by 
mortality in 1977 and 2007.  Consider first the age at which 50 percent of men 
were employed.  In 2007, the mortality rate when 50 percent of men were 
employed was 2.7 percent; 30 years later in 2007, the mortality rate was only 1.5 
percent, a decline of 1.2 percent.  That is for the employment rate to be 50 
percent in 2007, men “had to be” much healthier (by the mortality measure) than 
they were in 1977.  Looking at the data another way, at the age at which the 
mortality rate was 1.5 percent, in 1977 about 80 percent of men were employed 
but only 50 percent in 2007. 
 
Figures 1-8a and 1-8b show comparable figures for France.  Figure 1-8a, 
shows that for France the employment rate at ages 62 and 63 declined by almost 
30 percent.  In addition the mortality rate at these ages declined by about 1 
percent as well, about the same as in the United States.  Figure 1-8b shows that 
in France at the age at which 30 percent of men were employed the mortality rate 
was 2.7% in 1977 but only 1.1 percent in 2007, a decline of 1.6 percent.  That is 
for the employment rate to be 30 percent in 2007, men “had to be” much 
healthier (by the mortality measure) than they were in 1977.  Further, looking at 
the data another way, at the age at which the mortality rate was 1.1 percent, 90 
percent of men were employed in 1977 but only 30 percent in 2007. 
 
Figures 1-9a and 1-9b show comparable figures for the UK.  Figure 1-9a, 
shows that for the UK the employment rate at ages 62 and 63 declined by about 
20 percent.  In addition the mortality rate at these ages declined by about 1 
percent as well, about the same as in the United States and France.  Figure 1-9b 
shows that in the UK at the age at which 30 percent of men were employed the 
mortality rate was about 3.1% in 1977 but only about 1.5 percent in 2007, a 
decline of 1.6 percent.  That is for the employment rate to be 30 percent in 2007, 
men “had to be” much healthier (by the mortality measure) than they were in 
1977.  Further, looking at the data another way, at the age at which the mortality 
rate was 1.5 percent, almost 90 percent of men were employed in 1977 but only 
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The data necessary to make figures like these for all countries are not now 
included in the data files for each country.  We can however show variation 
across countries like that shown in the left hand vertical bars in Figures 1-7b, 1-
8b, and 1-9b.  Figure 1-10 shows the employment rate in years in the 2000s for   21 of 47 
men in eight countries when the mortality rate was 1.5 percent.  The rate varies 
from 4.5 percent in France to 50 percent in the United States.  The data in this 
figure are comparable to the data shown in Figure 1-6a and 1-6b above but those 
figures also show the employment rates when the mortality rate was much lower 
and the employment rate was similar across countries. This figure shows a very 






2.  Mortality vs. Self-Assessed Health 
 
  The figures above highlight the changing relationship between mortality 
and employment.  As emphasized above, mortality lends itself to these 
comparisons because mortality is comparable across time and across time within 
countries.  Other potential measures of health status are not comparable across 
countries and may not be comparable across time within countries.  Nonetheless, 
we would like to explore the relationship between mortality and another 
commonly used summary measure of health status. Perhaps the most commonly 
used measure is self-assessed health status (SAH).  We compare these two 
measures in several ways.  We first compare SAH and future mortality in the US.  
Second, we compare mortality equivalent ages over time with SAH equivalent 
ages over time.  We illustrate this idea with data for two countries, the United 
States and Sweden.  Third, we consider within countries the time trend 
relationship between mortality and SAH.  Finally, we combine the latter   22 of 47 
comparisons to estimate the cross-country relationship between the change in 
mortality over time with the comparable change in SAH over the same time 
period.     
 
  SAH and Future Mortality in the US:  Table 2-1 shows that in the United 
States Health and Retirement Study (HRS) SAH in 1992 is strongly predictive of 
subsequent mortality.  The table shows the proportion of men and women that is 
deceased by 1996, 
2002, and 2008.  For 
example, for men in 
excellent health only 
11.4 percent are 
deceased by 2008 
compared to 57.9 







US:  Figure 2-1 
compares these two 
measures for the 
United States.  First, 
the figure shows mortality by age in 1977 and in 2007.  The figure shows that a 
person age 77 in 2007 had about the same mortality rate as a person age 60 in 
1977, a difference of about 7 years.  Second, the figure shows the proportion of 
people who reported they were in fair or poor health, by age, in the 1970s and in 
2000s.  Comparing these two trends, men how were 69 in the 2000s had about 
the same SAH as men who were over 9 years younger, age 60, in the 1970s.  
Thus in this example there was a greater difference in age equivalent SAH than 






1996 1.0% 1.5% 2.1% 4.3% 10.8%
2002 5.8% 7.2% 13.3% 22.1% 36.9%
2008 11.4% 15.6% 25.8% 36.5% 57.9%
% in category 24.5% 29.6% 27.8% 11.5% 6.6%
1996 0.4% 0.8% 0.8% 2.1% 4.2%
2002 2.6% 5.4% 7.1% 15.2% 24.4%
2008 6.4% 10.3% 15.2% 28.8% 36.8%
% in category 23.1% 30.7% 25.7% 13.6% 6.9%
Women
Table 2-1.  Percentage of HRS respondents age 51 to 61 in 
1992 who are deceased by the beginning of each wave, by 
SAH in 1992, United States
year
Self-reported health in 1992
Men  23 of 47 
 
 
  Mortality Equivalent Ages versus SAH Equivalent Ages--Sweden:  Figure 
2-2 compares these two mortality and SAH for Sweden.  Mortality and SAH for 
Sweden are only available for age groups—45-54, 55-59, and 60-64.   The data 
used in the paper for Sweden are for 1976 and 2005.  For each of these years 
the average for the age intervals is plotted in Figure 2-2 at the mid point of the 
intervals.  These values are shown by the three markers for SAH and mortality 
for each of the two years.  Then the markers are fitted—the mortality markers 
with a power functional form and the SAH markers with a linear functional form.   
First, based on these rough approximations, the figure shows that a person age 
63 in 2005 had about the same mortality rate as a person age 55 in 1976, a 
difference of about 8 years.  Second, the figure shows the proportion of people 
who reported they were in poor health, by age, in the mid 1976 and in 2005.  
Comparing these two trends, men who were about 64 in the 2005 had about the 
same SAH as men who were about 9 years younger, age 55, in the 1976.  Thus 
in this example there is also a greater difference in age equivalent SAH than in 
age equivalent mortality (about 9 versus 8 years). 
 
Thus in both the United States and Sweden there appears to be a 
substantial correspondence between age equivalent mortality and age equivalent 
SAH. 
   24 of 47 
 
 
  Within-Country Trends in Mortality versus SAH:  The within country trends 
in several countries are shown in Figures 2-3a through 2-3e for the United 
States, Sweden, the Netherlands, Canada, and the United Kingdom respectively.  
For each of these countries, with the exception of the UK, there seems to be a 
close correspondence between the trend in mortality and the trend in SAH.  The 
SAH measure in the United Kingdom, however, differs from the measure used in 
the other countries—the UK uses ‘bad health’ versus ‘fair or poor health’ in the 
other countries.   
 
  It is important to note that, with the exception of the UK, even though there 
seems to be a systematic relationship between mortality and SAH within 
countries, it can be seen from the levels of the SAH values that the proportion of 
persons saying they are in fair or poor health varies greatly across countries. 





   26 of 47 



































































































































   27 of 47 
 
 
  Cross-Country Comparison Between the Percent Change in Mortality and 
the Percent Change in SAH; Figure 2-4 summarizes the relationship across 9 
countries for which both series are available over some time period.  It compares 
the percent change in “fair-poor” health with the percent change in mortality.  For 
each country the time period spans the year of the first SAH observation to the 
year of the last SAH observation.  For example, the period for the Netherlands is 
1983 to 2008.  The percent change in SAH is the percent difference between the 
1983 value and the 2008 value.  The percent change in mortality is over the 
same time period.  For the 9 countries that report the proportion in fair or poor 
health (or 1 minus the proportion in better health) there is a close relationship 
between the change in mortality and the change in SAH.  SAH is not available for 
Italy.  The data points for France and UK use different measures of health—the 
UK reports the percent in bad health and France reports the average of a 10-
point scale of health status.  This suggests a fairly tight within-country 
relationship between improvements in mortality and improvements in self-
assessed health, providing a link between our earlier mortality analysis and one 
commonly used health measure.  We emphasize again, however, that perusal of 
the figures above reveals that the level of SAH varies greatly from country to 
country, consistent with substantial country-specific SAH response effects. 
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3.  Mortality versus Other Health Measures   
 
  The evidence presented in section 2 suggests that on balance there is a 
substantial relationship between within-country trends in SAH and trends in 
mortality.  Here we consider how mortality is related to other health measures.  
While most countries have some data on SAH, the data on other health 
measures varies a great deal from country to country and the evidence on the 
relationship of the various measures to mortality is mixed. 
 
  To illustrate the various data series and their relationship to mortality we 
show examples from several countries—Denmark, Italy, Spain, Sweden, and 
Japan.  Figure 3-1 shows mortality rates for cancer, heart, brain, and respiratory 
causes in Denmark.  Among these “objective” measures of health only heart 
disease shows a strong and consistent decline.  Figure 3-2 shows mortality rates 
by cause for cancer, circulatory diseases, heart, cirrhosis, and respiratory causes 
in Italy, with especially large declines in the first three. 
 
  Figure 3-3 shows the trend in the incidence of major illnesses—
cholesterol, high blood pressure, allergies, diabetes, heart problems, and 
respiratory problems—in Spain.  The data show an increase in high blood 
pressure and cholesterol and little change in the others between 1987 and 2006.  
Figure 3-4 shows trends in circulatory disease, back pain, and “long-term 
disease” in Sweden, with an increase in circulatory disease and little change in   29 of 47 
the others.  Figure 3-5 shows trends for “feel not good or sick,” Activities of Daily 
Life, and SAH, with a downward trend in each of them. 
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4.  Mortality versus DI Participation 
 
  In this section we emphasize the general absence of a relationship 
between DI participation and health, as indicated by trends in mortality.  The 
evidence suggests that DI provisions, which determine participation rates, are 
essentially a train on their own track.  That is, DI provisions seem not to be 
endogenous with respect to health as indicated by mortality.   
 
  To summarize the evidence across countries, Figure 4-1 shows the 
percent change in DI participation against the percent change in mortality 
between 1980 and 2005.  There appears to be little relationship.  Although there 
was a wide variation across countries in the percent reduction in mortality over 
this period (from about -30 percent to -50 percent), the change in DI participation 
shows little relationship to the reduction in mortality.   
 
  To provide more detail on the trends within countries, Figures 4-2 to 4-6 
show the trends in mortality and DI participation in five countries--the UK, 
Canada, Italy, Sweden, and the US respectively.  It appears that the trend in DI 
participation in these countries is unrelated to the trend in mortality.  Given that 
SAH trends in the same direction as mortality in most countries for which we 
have data, as shown in section 2, it appears that there is also little relationship 
between SAH and DI participation.  
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5.  “Natural Experiments”: DI Reform and DI Participation 
 
  In future analysis, we will consider the relationship between DI provisions 
and labor force participation.  In particular we will ask:  Given health status, to 
what extent are differences across countries in the relationship between health 
status and LFP determined by the provisions of disability insurance programs?     
There are two key issues that are important in determining how the results of this 
analysis can be interpreted.  One is whether the relationship between labor force 
participation and DI provisions can be interpreted to represent the causal effect 
of the provisions on LFP.  If for example, DI reforms were adopted in part in 
response to low LFP of older workers, this reverse causality (endogeneity) would 
imply that to some extent the DI provisions were adopted in response to low LFP 
rather than low LFP being the result of DI provisions.  The second issue relates 
to DI provisions and health status.  Given health status, we will want to estimate 
the effect of DI provisions on the likelihood that a person is employed.  But, if DI 
provisions in a country were to some extent adopted in response to lower health 
status, we would overestimate the effect of DI provisions on LFP, given health 
status.  Above, we have shown substantial evidence that DI reforms in a country 
do not seem to follow changes in health status in the country. 
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Here we present several “natural experiments” showing the effect on LFP of 
reforms that were not prompted by changes in the health of older people or by 
changes in the LFP of older people.  For example, the DI reform in Belgium was 
prompted by a court ruling.  We also emphasize reforms in which the effect was 
on one gender but not the other or on persons of a given age and not other ages 
but in which the reforms we not intended to target these groups. We consider 
reforms in Canada, Germany, Belgium, Sweden, France, and Denmark.   
 
Canada:  Several changes occurred to the Canada Pension Plan Disability 
Insurance program starting in the mid-1980s, all in line with a trend toward 
making eligibility and benefits more generous. These reforms included an 
increase in the benefit level, a relaxation of the number of years one must have 
worked in order to qualify, and an enhancement of retroactivity in claiming 
benefits. An important reform in 1989 emphasized socio-economic factors such 
as the unemployment rate and job skills in the determination of eligibility for those 
aged 55 to 64. On top of this, efforts to publicize the availability of benefits were 
made. 
 
The trend toward increasing generosity of benefits and eligibility came to 
an end in 1995, following concerns about the now-high levels of participation and 
the associated cost. The provision for socio-economic considerations was 
removed, existing claimants were systematically re-examined, and a new 
emphasis on ‘self-sufficiency’ and returning to work was instituted. This reform 
had a very substantial effect on the DI participation rate.  The change for men 60 
to 64 is shown in Figure 5-1.  The rate was reduced from about 14 percent in 
1985 to less than 8 percent by 2007, a reduction of about 40 percent. 
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Germany:  The 1984 reform in Germany (effective in 1985) restricted 
disability pension eligibility and affected women in particular. To be eligible for 
disability benefits, workers had to have a minimum of three contribution years in 
the last five years. In effect, this ruled out claims for many women who did not 
work on a regular basis. Figure 5-2 shows the number of new DI claimants by 
year.  The reform had a dramatic effect on number of women retiring on a DI 
pension. The number was reduced from 173,000 in 1984 to 67,000 in 1986 (a 
reduction of over 60%), with further reduction to about 60,000 in the next few 
years.  The effect on men was much smaller, from about 163,000 in 1984 to 
129,000 in 1986. 
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The differential effect of the 1984 reform on men and women can also be 
seen by comparing the pathways to retirement for men and women.  Figures 5-
3a and 5-3b show pathways to retirement between 1960 and 2005 for women 
and men respectively.  The figures show the large effect of the 1984 on the 
proportion of women retiring by way of DI and the relatively small effect on the DI 
retirement path for men.  These figures show differential effects of other reforms 
on men and women.  For example, the 1972 reforms had a much greater effect 
on men than on women.  In general, in addition to differential effects of reform, 
the pathways to retirement have been quite different for men and women.   39 of 47 


























































































































Belgium: In 1997 the Belgian government was forced by a European Court 
of Justice ruling to harmonize the normal retirement age and the full career 
requirements for men and women.  This decision resulted in a large increase in   40 of 47 
the DI participation of women 60 to 64. The decision was to align the female full 
career definition to the definition for men.  Since 1997, the normal retirement age 
for women has been raised gradually from 60 to 61 in 1997, to 62 in 2000, 63 in 
2003, 64 in 2006 and to 65 in 2009.  These increases were accompanied by 
corresponding increases in full career requirements for women.  Prior to 1997, 
with a retirement age of 60, women over 60 were not eligible for DI benefits.  
Figure 5-4 shows the steep increase in DI participation thereafter.  The increase 
can be explained by the increase in the retirement age and the resulting increase 
in the LFP of women 60 to 64. This example also highlights the importance of 





Sweden: Until the 1990s, there was a trend in Sweden toward more liberal 
eligibility rules. That trend was reversed with a series of reforms in the 1990s. 
First, eligibility for DI for labor market reasons was abolished in 1991. Then, in 
1991 and 1992 access to sickness absence was restricted through legislative 
initiatives. Next, a focus on rehabilitation was introduced for employers and local 
governments. Finally, in 1997 special eligibility rules for older workers were 
abolished. 
The impact of these changes can be seen in Figures 5-5a and 5-5b, which 
show the reduction in DI participation following these reforms, for men and 
women respectively.  Overall there is a marked decreased in DI participation over 
the next several years following the reforms.  For persons 60 to 64, for example,   41 of 47 
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France:  Two policy changes in France in the late 1990s and early 2000s 
demonstrate the importance of reforms in determining sickness benefit 
participation.  First, some early retirement schemes were being phased out. For 
example, the number of recipients on an early retirement scheme, at ages 55 to 
59, dropped from 230,000 in 1997 to 130,000 in 2005). Unemployment (without 
search requirement after age 56 or 57) largely acted as a substitute--the number 
of recipients of unemployment benefits increasing from 270,000 to 400,000 over 
the same period.  Older workers may also have sought benefits through long-
term sickness leaves.  
In addition, stricter controls but without legislated reform, affected sickness 
benefits in 2004-2005.  There was an increase in the intensity of reviews for 
sickness benefit claims following concern over the rapid rise in uptake.  In 
principle, if sickness benefits were being used as a route to retirement by older 
workers, the stricter sickness benefit regime would have a heavier impact on 
older workers than on younger workers, who obtain sickness benefits in case of 
health problems.  
  Figure 5-6a and 5-6b for men and women respectively, support this 
explanation. The figures show the evolution of sickness benefits per capita (in 
1998 Euros) for five age groups--i.e. the total amounts of sickness benefits 
received by a given age group over its size in the full population, in order to 
correct for demographic shifts.  Consider Figure 5-6a for men. All age groups 
display an upward trend over the 1997-2008 period, with years 2000-2003 
standing out above that trend. However, the magnitude of the 2000-2003 “bump” 
is much larger for older workers in the age groups 55 to 59 and 60 to 64. In 
particular, the decrease in benefits that occurs in the overall population after 
2003 seems to be fully driven by the older age groups while the other groups 
only display a slowdown in growth after 2004-2005.  The patterns for men and 
women are quite similar although the bump is somewhat less apparent for 
women.  Thus these figures show not only the effect of DI (sickness) reforms on 
DI participation, but also highlight the substitution effects between retirement 
programs. 
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Denmark: The 1984 reforms of a number of programs in Denmark had a 
large effect on the number of women on DI, but almost no effect on men.  The   44 of 47 
primary disability program, called the Social Disability Program (SDP), was 
revamped with three tiers. The lowest of these took ‘social criteria’ into 
consideration, meaning that the age and employment prospects of the applicant 
were taken into account in determining DI eligibility.  These reforms led to a large 
and sudden shift of women from other programs and into the SDP disability 
insurance program. In short, with the introduction of the 1984 reforms some 
women became ineligible for DI but a much larger number became newly 
eligible, especially women age 60 and older.   
Figure 5-7a shows the jump in the participation rate of women age 60 to 
64 between 1973 and 1995.  The participation rate increased from about 18 
percent in 1983 to almost 35 percent in 1985.   
Figure 5-7b shows essentially the same information with respect to DI 
participation, but in the form of a large shift in pathways to retirement.  In 1983 
about 34 percent of women entered retirement by way of disability insurance.  In 
1885 this percent jumped to about 69 percent.
4  The figure also highlights the 
substantial changes in the pathways to retirement over the past 40 years.   
The Danish example highlights both the importance of substitution 
between programs for older workers and the non-health reasons for some of the 
shifts in disability insurance uptake. 
 
                                                 
4 The other programs are: an Unemployment Program, the PEW, the 65-66 Old Age 
Pension (OAP), the Widows Pension and the Early Old Age Pension (EOAP), the 
Transitional Benefit Program (TBP) for long term unemployed, and the Flex Job (FJ) 
program.   45 of 47 
 
  The Netherlands: Since the mid-1980s there have been a series 
of DI reforms aimed at reducing the number of DI recipients.  The analysis for the 
Netherlands makes an important point:  the success of these reforms depended 
in part on the (relative) attractiveness of alternative routes to retirement such as 
early retirement and unemployment insurance options. These programs also 
became less generous.  Taking this into account, an empirical evaluation of 
several reforms in DI, early retirement, and unemployment programs shows that, 
on balance, the reforms were associated with reductions in the inflow into DI and 
early retirement programs and an increase in inflow into unemployment 
insurance programs.  Such interaction among programs is important for other 
countries as well.  
 
6.  Summary and Conclusions 
The historical analysis in this volume is intended to set the stage for and 
inform more formal analysis of disability insurance programs.  The key question 
that future analysis will address is this:  Given health status, to what extent are 
the differences in LFP across countries determined by the provisions of disability 
insurance programs?  To answer this question we need to develop measures of 
health status that are comparable across countries, we need to understand to 
what extent DI insurance reforms are prompted by health status in a country, and 
we need to understand whether DI provisions are prompted by the employment 
circumstances of older people in each country.  Thus we have undertaken this 
historical analysis to help inform our future analysis.   
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   We began by considering changes in mortality over time and in particular 
the relationship between mortality and labor force participation.  In this context 
we think of mortality as one measure of health status that is comparable across 
countries and comparable over time within countries.  We gave particular 
attention to the relationship between mortality and labor force participation.  We 
find that even though LFP rates are quite similar at low mortality rates they 
diverge substantially with increasing mortality rates.  The divergence is very 
similar to the increasing divergence in LFP across countries at older ages. 
 
  Having in mind how mortality may be related to other measures of health, 
we then consider the relationship between the trends in mortality and self-
assessed health within a country.  In general, we find a rather strong relationship 
between the two trends, although with very different reported levels of self-
assessed health across countries.     
 
  We then consider how mortality is related to other indicators of health 
status.   Here the available data varies greatly from country to country and the 
relationship of the different measures to mortality trends also varies from country 
to country.  This is even true of objective measures such as heart disease or 
respiratory disease. 
  
  Then we consider how trends in DI participation are related to changes in 
health, in particular measured by the change in mortality.  We find little 
relationship over time within a country.  In this respect we conclude that DI 
insurance reforms are largely a train on their own track and not endogenously 
determined with respect to health.   
 
Finally we consider “natural experiments” in which the disability insurance 
reforms were not prompted by changes in health status or by changes in the 
employment circumstances of older workers.  We find that these “exogenous” 
reforms can have a very large effect on the labor force participation of older 
workers.   47 of 47 
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